• Central Bank of Brazil surprises markets and lowers SELIC 50 basis points.
• Banks increase reserves and provisions for bad debt to record levels.
• FGC Helps to Sanitize the Financial System

What are the implications for investors?  New-issue investors need to evaluate carefully the issuing entity’s portfolio for the quality of debt underwriting and the entity’s ability to service the loans.  Investors that currently hold FIDCs need to monitor the credit portfolio’s performance carefully.

We see weakness in consumer loans issued by banks and finance companies and we have no doubt that this is the single thread that unites some of the otherwise contradictory economic news in the Brazilian press. 
Both the Central Bank of Brazil (BCB) and the Fundo Garantidor de Crédito (Credit Guarantee Fund, FGC) have been working behind the scenes to contain the growing problems from NPLs and to prevent a full blown credit crisis in Brazil.

FIDCs do not have this government protection.  FIDC credit quality has deteriorated since the beginning of the year according to data we pulled from Orbis, a structured finance database and news service from Uqbar.  Of the 250 FIDCs in the Orbis system with data for the last seven months, 77% have seen increases in provisions for bad debt (PDD – Provisões Devedores Duvidosos).   PDD increased more than 100% since the beginning of the year in 29 FIDCs.  Fifteen of those deals were either multiple market or multiple segment deals.  Due to lack of transparency in the Brazilian ABS market, it is better to look directly at the credit markets themselves to understand these trends.

Putting Together Pieces to Understand Brazil’s Credit Markets

The August 30 meeting of the COPOM, the monetary committee for Brazil’s central bank (BCB), dramatically altered the general perception of the economic picture in Brazil when they cut SELIC by 50 basis points.  Most analysts were caught by surprise; however, our calculations show that the market had been forecasting approximately an 80% chance of a 25 basis point interest rate cut on August 29.   The COPOM has since been criticized from many corners for lowering the rate even though Brazilian inflation has not yet retreated.

The market now expects the COPOM to cut SELIC to about 10.25% by June 2012, while analysts polled by the BCB survey are divided between 10.50% and 10.75% as the low, as you can see in the first graph below.  Both the market and economists now view the BCB as very accommodative.  The BCB conveniently cites the growing problems in Europe as the motive for cutting rates.  We don’t believe that’s their main motivation.  In our view, the BCB and the Brazilian Government are more worried about the growing problems with consumer credit at home and about protecting the banking system.   This explains why the BCB cut rates at the risk of losing control of inflation and some credibility with the international financial community.

We have been warning that the Brazilian financial system is showing signs of strain due to the extraordinarily high growth in consumer credit balances and the high level of consumer NPLs since May 2011.  Government’s efforts to rein in the growth this market have failed.  We also pointed to the evidence that payments on consumer loans are not sufficiently large enough to amortize the principal. As a result loan balances continue to grow in spite of declining issuance (See our Second Quarter Review).

The Brazilian press continues to point to the overall low levels of non-performing loans and occasional reductions in the levels of non-performing loans.  We put these reports in the basket labeled “misleading statistics.” As with FIDCs, the overall numbers in the financial system are obscuring some important developments in the sub-sectors.  Most importantly, there is a growing number of NPLs on the consumer portfolios of both banks and non-bank finance companies.

Smaller Brazilian banks have encountered difficulties in managing their balance sheets since the 2008 global credit crisis.  These banks find it difficult to sell parts of their credit portfolios to the larger banks because the large banks have tightened up their credit underwriting standards, especially after the Banco PanAmericano scandal.  The graph below indicates two dangerous trends.  First, NPLs continue to run much higher than 2008/2009.  Second, the lagged but sudden increase in NPLs in bank portfolios indicates that the problems in consumer credit portfolios for non-bank finance operations seem to be affecting or “contaminating” the bank consumer credit portfolios.

Estado de São Paulo announced in a September 15 edition that the Fundo Garantidor de Créditos (FGC) had realized “sanitation operations” of around R$7.5 billion this year to clean up problems with some medium and small sized banks.    The most recent operation transferred Banco Matone to Grupo JBS, thanks to support of R$850 million from the FGC.  The other big “sanitizing operation” for 2011 was a R$1.5 billion package help BMG absorb Banco Shahin.  That leaves roughly R$5 billion more in other operations that have been used to shore up other banks.  FGC currently has resources of a little more than R$26.8 billion.  This means that the fund has spent about 25% to 33% of its resources to prop up the financial system this year.

It is clear that the BCB and the Brazilian government are trying to avoid a panic.  An editorial in Estado de São Paulo points out that the FGV’s operations have two advantages promoted by Brazil’s Central Bank:  they don’t involve public money and they are discreet.  The operation’s discretion prevents depositors from panicking about the financial health of other banks.    The editorial points out that this helps reduce systemic risk in the Brazilian financial system.

At the end of August we produced a report that analyzed the recent actions taken by Brazilian banks to shore up reserves and increase provisions for non-performing loans.  (See “At What Height Does A Bank Seawall Protect From a Credit Tsunami?”)  The biggest Brazilian private and government banks have been increasing loan loss provisions and reserves to almost unheard of levels.  Caixa Econômica Federal is provisioning 300% of NPLs.   Given that banks recover on average 30% to 40% of bad debt, with the range spanning from 5% to 60% of the value of loan, a provision of 300% of NPLs seems like overkill unless the bank knows something that the public doesn’t.  Brazilian banks execute “renegotiation operations” that banks in other countries would normally consider bridge loans for defaults.  The BCB would know if banks are entering into these types of agreements frequently.

Summarizing the condition of the FIDC Market

This brings us to the FIDC market in Brazil.  The statistics are deceptively reassuring.  As the graph below demonstrates, the overall PDD level has been fairly stable.  It appears that the problems in the consumer credit market have not yet affected FIDCs in general.  As with the banking system, we believe the overall statistics are hiding the problems.  Statisticians often quote the paradox of a person drowning in a river that is on average 5 inches deep.   We believe that the distributions are skewed and that the averages are hiding problems.

We used data from Orbis to calculate the percent change PDD from January to July 2011 and plotted the data in the histogram in the fourth graph below.  We took out all of the deals with extraordinary changes over 500% to error on the side of caution in our calculations.  PDD increased by more than 25% in more than 47.6% of the FIDCs over this period, even with our conservative approach.

Part of this artificial stability stems from the issuer’s ability (and common practice) to buy back loans that are more than 90 days past due.  However, the CVM has passed new rules (Instruction 489) that will severely limit the balance sheet options for issuers who repurchase substantial amounts bad loans from FIDC credit portfolios.  In addition, the banks will not have the balance sheets to continue this practice if the credit markets continue to deteriorate.   We believe this picture will worsen as the economy slows down more.

As stated in the opening, new issue investors need to evaluate carefully the issuing entity’s portfolio for the quality of debt underwriting and the entity’s ability to service the loans.  Investors that currently hold FIDCs need to monitor the credit portfolio’s performance carefully for the near future.

As bank portfolios deteriorate in quality and larger banks rein in issues, smaller banks will have more incentive to sell loans into FIDCs. Investors in FIDCs backed by short term credit, such as factoring receivables, need to be especially vigilant.  These revolving FIDCs experience large turnover and the credit quality can drop dramatically in one month. Any sudden jumps in PDD or sharp increases in late payments (Créditos Vencidos e Não Pagos – CVNP) should be investigated quickly.   This information can be found on the Informe Mensal on the CVM website.

According to the CVM website, 23 FIIs with a total value of R$561 million where registered in 2008. In 2010, 39 FIIs were registered with a total value of R$9.7 billion. As of August 2011, 26 FIIs have been registered with a value of R$4.8 billion versus 16 FIIs in the same period of 2010 with a value of R$2 billion. In 2008 there were R$4.7 billion CRIs issued, R$3.8 billion in 2009, and R$8.53 billion in 2010, almost twice as high as the previous record in 2008. (CVM data)

The Comissão de Valores Mobiliários (CVM – the Brazilian equivalent of the SEC) had restricted FII to investments in pure real estate. The rules were relaxed in 2009 to allow FIIs to buy other types of real estate securities, such as CRIs, as well as the pure real estate. The new regulations also allowed CRI-backed FIIs to pass-through the tax advantages embedded in CRIs. This was one of the main factors in the growth in the market for FIIs.

However, there are recent signs that the market is cooling off. The performance of the FII market has fallen in the last four months according to Uqbar (a Brazilian firm that tracks the FII market and provides data through its Orbis service). In 2010 the 22 most actively traded FIIs returned a capitalization weighted average of 21.2% (Data from Uqbar, LatAm Structured Finance calculation). Just the price appreciation of FIIs was 13.2% in 2010. In April 2011 the average 12 month price return was 16.5%, in May and June 14.6%, and dropped to 12.2% in July.

Like the market for FIIs, real estate in Brazil is experiencing some hiccups after increasing steadily over the last few years. On August 31, 2011, Estado de São Paulo reported that the unit sales in the city of São Paulo fell 31% in the first half of 2011 and fell 28% in the São Paulo metropolitan area. While the level of activity is cooling off some, the São Paulo real estate market is still seeing lots of activity with 80% of the listed property being sold in 6 months or less. However, the market makers warn that this level of activity can only be maintained with continued economic growth and the availability of credit.

http://www.estadao.com.br/noticias/impresso,sinais-de-acomodacao-no-segmento-imobiliario,766321,0.htm

In a side article in the same edition, Ana Maria Castelo, an economist with Fundação Getúlio Vargas (FGV), writes that Porto Alegre and Belo Horizonte also experienced weaker real estate sales. She notes that this slow down started before the growing global credit problems and arises from domestic factors. Demand in 2010 was overheated and credit expanded very rapidly. This increased building activity also drove up prices and construction costs increased 7.71% in the last twelve months. Castelo argues that this is still not a bubble because the growth is sustainable and that Brazilian real estate will continue to perform well despite these recent setbacks. “Prices may not increase as dramatically, but they will not fall. Buyers will become more cautious as the prices continue to increase and financing will be limited by the level of income.”

http://www.estadao.com.br/noticias/impresso,nao-temos-bolha-o-mercado-vai-continuar-aquecido,766325,0.htm

The market for FIIs and CRIs in Brazil should be followed closely if the investor is planning on entering at these levels. The Brazilian economy is still growing but the growth is slowing dramatically. While delinquencies on real estate for business and residential purposes are at multi-years lows, Brazil is experiencing a bubble in the consumer credit markets and non-performing loans in this sector are rising rapidly. Banks are cutting back on credit and tightening their underwriting criteria. It is time to use some caution and look at the possibility of muted price gains for the foreseeable future in the Brazilian real estate market and the market for securities backed by real estate and real estate debt.

Event Info
Event Title: Echelon 2011
Date: June 16 and 17
Venue: University Cultural Centre, National University of Singapore
Organizer: e27
Event URL: http://echelon.e27.sg/
Email to: contact@e27.sg

In the corporate finance and investment banking world, there is no such thing as free advice. There is advice that you get before you pay, and there is advice that you get after you pay. Many companies looking for funding prefer the former, without considering that the price to pay will be significantly higher in the former scenario than in the latter.

Let’s consider an example. Company A (“CO”) identifies a business opportunity and needs to raise $5 million additional capital for their business in order to pursue this opportunity. Like all opportunities, this one has a shelf life and CO has three months to raise the capital, or lose the deal. The opportunity cost is $15 million in potential profits.

Having exhausted their primary banking and financing contacts, the management of CO then decide to approach Investment Bank A (“IBa”) for advice on raising new capital for their business. IBa charges $20,000 advisory and 3% success fees for advising CO on their capital raising efforts, and provides a clear engagement letter which mentions the timeline and scope of work that will be provided for the advisory fees. CO, at the same time contacts Investment Bank B (“IBb”) and Investment Bank C (“IBc”) to ask for the same assistance in capital raising. IBb and IBc agree to work for free, and be paid only if they successfully raise the $5 million for CO. IBb asks for 5% success fee and IBc asks for 3% success fees with 5% equity stake.

Question: Which route would you go for if you were CO?

There is certainly a need for a reality check for everyone looking to raise capital for their business or projects.

Venue: Dusit Thani Hotel, Sheikh Zayed Road, Dubai

Date: February 04, 2010

Time: From 7:00PM

Fees: $40 (including first drink)

As this is our first event, we are keeping it to a maximum of 50 attendees so networking can be done more effectively. All attendees will have their company profiles featured in the Middle East Hedge Funds Group newsletter, free of charge, which goes out to 1,749 investment professionals who have interest in the Middle East.

We look forward to meeting you at the event.

I was recently appointed as the President of the Singapore Business Council (UAE). The vision of the Singapore Business Council (UAE) is to be the focal point for Singaporean entities and individuals seeking opportunities with other entities in the Gulf, and also to assist in positioning Singapore as a base for foreign businesses to expand into, in partnership with Singaporean entities and individuals.

If you are in Dubai, drop me a note (felix@felixsim.com) and I’ll be happy to meet up if time suits.

Guts. That’s probably the correct word to use to describe someone who comes up with a provocative yet realistic film about the present world that’s crumbling around us, and the sad future that’s awaiting us if we continue to act the same way.

In Broke, Michael breaks the problem down into digestible pieces, through interviews with people on the street, industry professionals, and academics. He answers the question “Why do some people make money, and others lose” by interviewing the best in the industry. In typical Michael Covel fashion, he interviews and borrows the experiences of heavyweight investors such as Jim Rogers and Mark Mobius, and academics such as Harry Markowitz and Dr. Vernon Smith. Michael even interviews poker players!

Like sheep, Michael reminds us in Broke that we’re all constantly faced with tough decisions, and that it psychologically feels better to be with others than to be alone – even if the crowded is wrong.  Investing in Real Estate with no money down, believing and supporting State Capitalism, and listening to the Media are taking us down Broker Avenue, and in the film Michael finds people who know what they are talking about to explain to the viewers, why.

A scary thought and reality that is emphasized in Broke, is that a huge number of people around the world depend on the lottery to make enough money for retirement. A larger number also invests in mutual funds. Interestingly, Michael draws a parallel to playing poker or investing in hedge funds, where one would have a higher probability of winning (i.e. making money).

Michael has once again touched the right nerves by producing Broke to remind us all of the realities of life, as a lesser, kinder message would not be put across and taken seriously. The price of the Broke DVD ($19.99) is probably less than the daily average of how much each person spends on lottery tickets. Watch it, or you will be broke. It’s more than just a bedtime movie.

Broke can be purchased directly from www.brokemovie.com.

P.S. If you live in the UAE (Dubai, Abu Dhabi, etc.) and would like me to organize a mass order to save on shipping, please drop me an email.

Go with the flow or drown in the flood is really the best way to describe what Michael highlights in his book.

If you’re a Market Wizards fan, you’re definitely going to like the interviews and case studies that Michael puts in this book. Just the case studies and interviews conducted by Michael inTrend Following (Updated Edition) is akin to Market Wizards on steroids. There is so much data in this book that an amateur would miss if taken lightly. The case studies, side bar quotes, and the personal stories and philosophy of successful trend followers are extremely good reads and useful in a trader’s business. Fund managers and investors would also find this book a good read, as it explains reasonably well the reason why most lost (a lot of) money in 2008.

Learn more about the book and the other interesting stuff Michael has on his website, http://www.trendfollowing.com/